Dalai lama of tibet and relationship with china

Dalai Lama on 'Relationship with China' | Friends of Tibet (INDIA)

dalai lama of tibet and relationship with china

In , tensions continued between the EU and China over visits to Europe by the Dalai Lama and the human-rights situation in Tibet, including cultural and. The 14th Dalai Lama (religious name: Tenzin Gyatso, shortened from Jetsun Jamphel From the time of the 5th Dalai Lama to , the central government of Tibet, the Ganden Phodrang, invested the position of duties on 17 November , at the age of 15, after the People's Republic of China's incorporation of Tibet. Signs of a thaw in the relationship between Tibet's spiritual leader and the Chinese president could mark the beginning of a new era.

The Note from the forreign secretary, however, refers to the 'large public event titled "Thank You India" slated for 1st April,' to which a large number of Indian dignataries would be invited and these was 'likely to be followed up by additional events in Delhi as well as other states of India. Have they been issued in the past as well? Quite clearly, the 'sensitive' nature of the subject of the Note is neither new nor is the fact unknown that this is a 'core' concern for the Chinese.

Ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, there has been no occasion when Beijing's reactions have not been over the top, so to say, whenever there is any move by anycountry, which has implications for the PRC's territorial integrity and sovereignty most categorical when it involves Taiwan and Tibet and when they feel that their interests in this regard are affected in any way. It stands to reason that the government would, in a general way, issue such advisory notes from time to time, when matters of grave importance were involved and it would not be surprising if notes on this specific issue were sent around occasionally by the MEA in the past as well, possibly on the eve of State visits or when some very high profile functions were organised.

The foreign secretary's note had particularly referred to the 'large public event' as also 'additional events'. In the Circular, as reported by the Indian Express article, there does not appear to be any further elaboration regarding the nature of the 'proposed commemorative events' in which there should be no participation. Prima facie, this would appear to include all categories of events pertaining to the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama's arrival in India.

The Directive from the Cabinet Secretary specifically instructs the secretaries and heads of government departments that 'participation in these events should be discouraged' and 'accordingly you are requested to ensure appropriate action on the matter.

That the message was not lost on Dharamsala emerged in the comment made by Ngodup Dhongchung, the Dalai Lama's representative in Delhi, when he confirmed that the event has been rescheduled and shifted to Dharamsala.

dalai lama of tibet and relationship with china

But we are guests of India. Indian people have been very generous to us. We understand the compulsions,' Dhongchung said. We respect the Indian government's decision. We have no further comments.

Among the Indian officials who received the Dalai Lama, centre, when he arrived in India in March was Har Mander Singh, left, the political officer responsible for the Kameng Frontier Division, and P N Menon, second from right, who served as India's consul general in Lhasa, and as intermediary to the Dalai Lama during the Tibetan uprising. Ambassador Menon's son Shivshankar Menon later became India's foreign secretary and national security adviser.

dalai lama of tibet and relationship with china

Kind courtesy Claude Arpi Anniversaries are certainly very significant for the Chinese -- and they would be aware of the celebrations being planned by the Tibetan exile community in India. In the backdrop of the developments in the past few years, they would certainly observe New Delhi's handling of the matter. Undoubtedly, the Note and its fallout would have been duly noted by Beijing and given the reported fact that it 'was sent a day before the Beijing visit of the Foreign Secretary, there seems to be a prima facie case for a quid pro quo having occurred, with China removing its objection to placing Pakistan on the grey list of the FATF Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering.

However, the phrasing provides scope for a degree of ambiguity, within which the government as also various political parties, have often operated. The Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala is registered under the Registrar of Societies Act which enables it to receive foreign funding.

dalai lama of tibet and relationship with china

While there would be no official sanction or any endorsement of Tibetan activities bearing a 'political' nature, cultural, religious and other non-political activites have been regularly patronised by a wide range of politicians and civil society peronalities.

The Dalai Lama is invariably addressed as 'Your Holiness' at all public events. This is problematic for the Chinese who have employed an amazing array of epithets to describe him, the least offensve of which is 'splittist' and 'dangerous separatist. What we are looking at is not so much a downgrading of the affairs of the Tibetan exile community, as reverting to the earlier approach of distancing the government from events and activities organised by the Dalai Lama or the Central Tibetan Administration.

7 - Relations with China on the Dalai Lama and Tibet

The interesting historical footnote here is that as the joint secretary of the East Asia division in the MEA, the current foreign secretary had ensured that there was no government participation in the '50 Years in Exile events' organised in In fact, there have been numerous other occasions in the past when the government has taken a step backwards or reconsidered its decision with regard to either hosting specific events or cancelled meetings scheduled with the Dalai Lama.

Often to our discomfiture. The question thus arises whether this note and circular indicates that the government is being cautious and circumspect, in view of the strong protests by China over the last few years involving the Dalai Lama's activities and in view of the tensions and strains that had begun to emerge between the two Asian giants.

This formulation would, however, appear to suggest that circumspection was somewhat in abeyance earlier. To some extent, if we look at the various developments over the past few years, there has certainly been a hardening of views on the Tibetan issue, within the strategic community. Equally, we saw some rethinking taking place within official circles, viz the invitation to Lobsang Sangay -- president, Central Tibetan Administration -- to particiapte in the swearing-in of the Modi government on May 26, In fact, even the joint statement issued during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit in did not mention Tibet, though there was a reference to the one-China policy and India's commitment to oppose any 'activity that is against the one-China principle.

To be sure, the prime minister himself has never met with the Dalai Lama though other political personalities have. Let us not forget that when then President Pranab Mukherjee hosted the Dalai Lama along with other Nobel Prize winners in Decemberthe Indian side had to issue an explanation as regards the the 'non-political' nature of the event.

In Octoberin a first, the then US ambassador to India, Richard Verma, visited Tawang, described by India as 'routine', which was criticised by the Chinese as 'interference. In Octoberthe Dalai Lama was given the go-ahead to visit Arunachal Pradesh for a religious festival in Aprilinviting a furious objection from China.

It may be recalled that the Dalai Lama had been extended permission to visit Arunachal Pradesh for the first time in by the Manmohan Singh government.

Dalai Lama snub and India's plans to reset China ties

But the visit in went further when he was welcomed there by the chief minister of the state and the central minister of state of home affairs Kiren Rijuju, which made a qualitative shift as far as the Chinese were concerned. The Dalai Lama on his part has not hesitated to laud the shedding of India's 'over-cautious' behaviour vis-a-vis China and the Tibetan issue has undoubtedly become embroiled in the politics within Arunachal Pradesh.

Reacting to Beijing's furious reaction during the Dalai Lama's April visit, the chief minister of the north eastern state declared that Beijing had no right to meddle since India shared a border with Tibet and not China. And above all, it would be well to recall the diplomatic fiasco that ensued following the Dalai Lama's visit to Mongolia in November China censured the Mongolian government and demanded an apology from the Mongolian government on pain of losing financial assistance and cancelled bilateral talks.

India did not have the capability to step in and offer to bail the Mongolians out -- and it would certainly be counterproductive to wade into Sino-Mongolian waters. Despite Prime Minister Modi's visit to Mongolia in May and the extension of a line of credit, subsequent actions on the part of the Mongolian government made it crystal clear who was calling the shots.

Over the past few years, we have been witness to a plateau-ing of the momentum in India-China ties and despite the oft-repeated, rather vacuous homily, that 'both sides should not let differences become disputes', we have regrettably been unable to move forward.

The tripwires generating the tensions are China's consistent 'technical' opposition to the UN Security Council resolution to place Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist Masood Azhar on the UN Terror list; going ahead with the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in the territory claimed by India, its veto on the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver and the dragging of its feet on the issue of India's permanent membership of the UN Security Council.

Cumulatively, these have amounted to a blatant lack of 'sensitivity' to India's 'core' concerns. Amongst other omens, the head of the embalmed body of the thirteenth Dalai Lamaat first facing south-east, had turned to face the north-east, indicating, it was interpreted, the direction in which his successor would be found.

Relations with China on the Dalai Lama and Tibet - ECFR's European Foreign Policy Scorecard

The RegentReting Rinpocheshortly afterwards had a vision at the sacred lake of Lhamo La-tso which he interpreted as Amdo being the region to search. This vision was also interpreted to refer to a large monastery with a gilded roof and turquoise tiles, and a twisting path from it to a hill to the east, opposite which stood a small house with distinctive eaves.

The team, led by Kewtsang Rinpochewent first to meet the Panchen Lamawho had been stuck in Jyekundoin northern Kham. Within a year the Panchen Lama had died. Two of his three candidates were crossed off the list but the third, a "fearless" child, the most promising, was from Taktser village, which, as in the vision, was on a hill, at the end of a trail leading to Taktser from the great Kumbum Monastery with its gilded, turquoise roof.

There they found a house, as interpreted from the vision—the house where Lhamo Dhondup lived. He held an old rosary that had belonged to the 13th Dalai Lama, and the boy Lhamo Dhondup, aged two, approached and asked for it. The monk said "if you know who I am, you can have it. The next time the party returned to the house, they revealed their real purpose and asked permission to subject the boy to certain tests.

  • 7 - Relations with China and the Dalai Lama on Tibet
  • Dalai Lama
  • 14th Dalai Lama

One test consisted of showing him various pairs of objects, one of which had belonged to the 13th Dalai Lama and one which had not. In every case, he chose the Dalai Lama's own objects and rejected the others.

Relations with China and the Dalai Lama on Tibet - ECFR's European Foreign Policy Scorecard

They knew that if he was declared to be the Dalai Lama, the Chinese government would insist on sending a large army escort with him, which would then stay in Lhasa and refuse to budge. They paid Ma Bufang on behalf of the Tibetan government against promissory notes to be redeemed, with interest, in Lhasa. Furthermore, the Indian government helped the Tibetans raise the ransom funds by affording them import concessions. As soon as they were out of Ma Bufang's area, he was officially declared to be the 14th Dalai Lama by the Central Government of Tibet, and after ten weeks of travel he arrived in Lhasa on 8 October There was very limited Chinese involvement at this time.

His devotees, as well as much of the Western world, often call him His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the style employed on the Dalai Lama's website. According to the Dalai Lama, he had a succession of tutors in Tibet including Reting RinpocheTathag Rinpoche, Ling Rinpoche and lastly Trijang Rinpochewho became junior tutor when he was nineteen. The two remained friends until Harrer's death in He passed with honours and was awarded the Lharampa degreethe highest-level geshe degree, roughly equivalent to a doctorate in Buddhist philosophy.

Dalai Lama and the History Between Tibet and Communist China.

This began with the 5th Dalai Lama 's rule in and lasted until the s except for —during which period the Dalai Lamas headed the Tibetan government or Ganden Phodrang. Until however, when the 13th Dalai Lama declared the complete independence of Tibettheir rule was generally subject to patronage and protection of firstly Mongol kings — and then the Manchu -led Qing dynasty — China claims that the Kuomintang government ratified the 14th Dalai Lama and that a Kuomintang representative, General Wu Zhongxinpresided over the ceremony.

The British Representative Sir Basil Gould was also at the ceremony and bore witness to the falsity of the Chinese claim to have presided over it. He criticised the Chinese account as follows: The report was issued in the Chinese Press that Mr Wu had escorted the Dalai Lama to his throne and announced his installation, that the Dalai Lama had returned thanks, and prostrated himself in token of his gratitude.

Every one of these Chinese claims was false. Mr Wu was merely a passive spectator. He did no more than present a ceremonial scarf, as was done by the others, including the British Representative. But the Chinese have the ear of the world, and can later refer to their press records and present an account of historical events that is wholly untrue.