The Complexities of Contemporary India-China Relations – Chinese Studies Association of Australia
relationship critical not only for those living in China and India, but for the whole world. Regardless of a . India since .. well as the political aspects of the relationship needs to be analyzed in order to understand the. Rather I wish to turn the spotlight on an aspect of the fifty year crisis that has For most of the Cold War years, Sino-Indian relations were conditioned by the state . time since April , India and China began political negotiations to resolve. The contemporary relationship between India and China is often described as one Political scientists have, on the other hand, used the models of realism or and the two countries have not engaged in full-fledged armed conflict since aspects of contemporary India-China relations by focusing on three issues.
The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies… to avoid being dominated by those who can. However, exclusive alliances between either China or India with dominant powers do not feature prominently; there are more incentives for the two in a strategic partnership.
According to a report, China has deployed approximately three hundred thousand troops within the region. Even during the conflict, Chinese leaders, including Mao, acknowledged that the conflict was not about the boundary or territory but about Tibet.
India-China Relations: How Can They Be Improved? - Future Directions International
China has traditionally valued Pakistan as a strategic hedge against India. To some China scholars, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India;for Pakistan, China is a high-value guarantor of security against India. In the process, they have been perceived as obstructionists, particularly by the G From their own vantage points, both have been driven to their current postures by domestic concerns.
For both, their economic resurgence is directly linked to overseas trade and energy demands, most of which are seaborne, along with which come maritime threat perceptions.
Enhanced relations through ASEAN are beneficial for both India and China and can be helpful in strengthening economic linkages between them. Their impressive records of raising hundreds of millions out of abject poverty, in the midst of international crises, must be commended.
Collectively, their two giant economies have become pillars of the global economy, supplying vital resistance to the financial tsunami that has swept the system since From an Indian perspective, New Delhi is committed to efforts towards bridging the gaps in its relations with China.
Former Foreign Minister S. We will continue to engage China in a constructive and forward-looking manner so that both countries can achieve a win-win situation. In the Indo-Pacific, broadly defined, achieving and maintaining that is fundamental to the interests of both India and China. Individually and collectively, both countries need to find ways to ensure that all the prospects of a resurgent Asia are realised.
Given their similar developmental challenges and huge populations, the quest for a stable economic environment is not surprisingly a core concern for both countries. What is critical for both India and China is to fashion a solid strategic alliance, since, as Asian behemoths, what could trouble one could easily trouble — or maybe even topple a government — in the other.
In the Indo-Pacific, there are several broad, possible approaches to the rise of China.
There is even the suggestion of countries band-wagoning against China. There is no clear evidence of deliberate containment or balancing behaviour at present.
After all, if it were simply a matter of a rising power, countries in the region should also balance against a rising India.
China–India relations - Wikipedia
Therefore, none of these notions are as clear cut as the concepts themselves would suggest, but there is another option: It is an approach that Australia is very familiar with. At the same time, Australia seeks to strengthen its military and strategic relationship with the US, reassuring Washington of its loyalty.
Australia is also attempting to forge a deeper and more co-operative relationship with India.
Australia is critically positioned to not only benefit from a prosperous and secure Asia; it is also in the foreground of power projections. Physically, Australia is the other side of the Asian bottleneck squeezing the Indonesian archipelago and its various chokepoints.
Australia, therefore, has a critical interest in promoting the positive changes in the region brought about by increasing prosperity and, to the extent that they contribute to stability rather than arms races, military modernisation programmes. Ultimately, far from being a buffer state whose interests are wedged between great powers, the rise of the Indo-Pacific, and China and India in particular, offers an opportunity to help frame opinions and contribute to the emerging regional architecture.
From the South Pacific to its Indian Ocean territories, Australia should encourage Sino-Indian engagement to be conducted in a balanced manner and on a level playing field. Since the border clash ofthe only thing fired across the Sino-Indian borders has been rhetoric.
A subtle arms race is perceived as being managed and both are wary of any third party intervention. Remaining overly focussed on border disputes will mean missed opportunities when the relationship between India and China needs to be widened and reinforced to serve as the pillar for regional security and prosperity. This gives wide latitude to both countries for the maximum fulfilment of their national interests. Symbiosis is the key term. A prosperous and growing China is good for India.
We will be friends again some day. The next move was evident to both sides: Mishra and Yang continued desultory talks until the end of A few months later the Bangladesh crisis erupted. T he crisis once again placed India and China at odds. This time there was an additional twist.
In the event, Beijing took a cautious stance throughout the crisis. China refused to go along with the US suggestion for making military moves along the border with India at the height of the war in December The Chinese were, of course, mindful of the danger in drawing in the Soviet Union. But they were also desirous of avoiding another major rupture in their relationship with India.
Four years later India and China formally exchanged ambassadors, so taking the first step towards normalization of ties. By the time Deng Xiaoping was firmly at the helm inthe strategic situation confronting China had changed dramatically.
The US had pulled out of Vietnam two years earlier. In the ensuing vacuum, the Soviet Union and Vietnam had stepped up their cooperation. Deng believed that Vietnam sought to be the premier power in South East Asia while the Soviet Union sought nothing less than global hegemony.
And China should also try to pull countries like India away from the Soviet embrace.
India-China Relations: How Can They Be Improved?
More importantly, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing inthe first prime ministerial visit in 34 years. T he early s were a period of strategic disorientation for India and China. The collapse of the Soviet Union capsized much of the official wisdom in both countries on the nature of the international system and the challenges and opportunities it presented. Unfortunately, the crumbling of the Russian threat coincided with the Tiananmen Square crisis.
It called into question all the assumptions about China being a different kind of communist power that had underpinned American congressional and public support for the close strategic relationship since For the first time since AprilIndia and China began political negotiations to resolve the dispute.
As a first step, China quietly dropped its stance on not recognizing Sikkim as part of India. It was agreed that the two sides would aim at a comprehensive solution encompassing all three sectors of the Sino-Indian border. The agreed boundary would follow well-defined geographical features and respect the interests of the settled populations. This was a major step forward in resolving the thorniest issue between India and China. The two countries also announced a bilateral Strategic and Cooperative Partnership.
This is due to at least three reasons. First, both sides have been unwilling to show their hand too soon and seem unclear on what compromises they could sell to the domestic constituencies.
Second, the unrest in Tibet since early has yet again cast a shadow on the boundary issue. Indeed, on his first trip to China, President Obama seemed to downplay the importance of countries like India even as he elevated China to a near-equal status.
This decision has resulted in a series of moves by the US to create a new architecture for Asia in both the economic and security domains.
This will be crucial to ensuring that the US remains the premier power even as it undergoes a relative decline owing to the rise of China. Australia, Malaysia, Peru, Japan and Vietnam. The TPP has an ambitious tripartite agenda. China regards the TPP as an economic grouping directed at it.
This is not surprising given that the TPP is being promoted when American leaders are also rebuking China for practising unfair trade. The security side of the architecture is more explicitly aimed at balancing the rise of China.
The US has concluded an agreement to station troops in Australia. It is looking to reinforce ties with its other formal allies in the region: Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Thailand. Washington intends to recast the EAS as the main forum for regional security and political issues.
It has already shown its willingness to intervene in regional disputes such as the South China Sea. Meantime, India has also invigorated its strategic ties with a range of countries in the region: These developments coupled with the backlash from its maritime neighbours have led China yet again to take India more seriously.
Even as the decadal change of leadership took place in Beijing recently, China sought to assure India that it was committed to resolving outstanding problems and strengthening the economic and strategic dimensions of the bilateral relationship. In this unfolding scenario, India has to make its moves deliberately. So long as China perceives that India has not committed itself irrevocably to a countervailing coalition led by the US and that India has a diversified set of regional relationships, it is likely that China will look to improve ties with India.
The challenge for New Delhi today is not just to ensure this room for strategic manoeuvre. Nor is it merely to keep a tab on the state of the bilateral relationship. Only by so doing will India be able to anticipate shifts in Chinese policy and position itself most advantageously.
Allen Lane, New Delhi,pp. Perry Anderson, Indian Ideology. Three Essays Collective, New Delhi, Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since Bodley Head, London,pp.
The Complexities of Contemporary India-China Relations
Simon Schuster, New York,pp. Rudra Chaudhuri, Forged in Crisis: India and the United States Since Hurst, London, forthcoming India, China and the Struggle for an Idea. Oxford University Press, New Delhi,pp.